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ABSTRACT
OBJECTIVE: Analyze the implementation of drug price regulation policy 
by the Drug Market Regulation Chamber.
METHODS: This is an interview-based study, which was undertaken in 
2012, using semi-structured questionnaires with social actors from the 
pharmaceutical market, the pharmaceuticals industry, consumers and the 
regulatory agency. In addition, drug prices were compiled based on surveys 
conducted in the state of Sao Paulo, at the point of sale, between February 
2009 and May 2012.
RESULTS: The mean drug prices charged at the point of sale (pharmacies) 
were well below the maximum price to the consumer, compared with 
many drugs sold in Brazil. Between 2009 and 2012, 44 of the 129 prices, 
corresponding to 99 drugs listed in the database of compiled prices, showed 
a variation of more than 20.0% in the mean prices at the point of sale and the 
maximum price to the consumer. In addition, many laboratories have refused 
to apply the price adequacy coefficient in their sales to government agencies.
CONCLUSIONS: The regulation implemented by the pharmaceutical 
market regulator was unable to significantly control prices of marketed 
drugs, without succeeding to push them to levels lower than those determined 
by the pharmaceutical industry and failing, therefore, in its objective to 
promote pharmaceutical support for the public. It is necessary reconstruct 
the regulatory law to allow market prices to be reduced by the regulator as 
well as institutional strengthen this government body.
DESCRIPTORS: Drug Price. Drugs, Essential, economics. National 
Drug Policy. National Policy of Pharmaceutical Assistance. Health 
Care Coordination and Monitoring. 
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The high prices of essential drugs are recognized as a 
serious public health problem in Brazil.13,a Given that 
almost eight out of 10 purchases of drugs are currently 
paid for by patients,b drug prices constitute an important 
variable for determining the population’s access to phar-
maceutical products.8,14,c
This situation results in the poorer classes being 
those members of society that are most harmed.3,5,15,d 
According to the Pesquisa de Orçamentos Familiares 
(POF – Brazilian Household Expenditure Survey), 
RESUMO
OBJETIVO: Analisar a implementação da política de regulação de preços de 
medicamentos pela Câmara de Regulação do Mercado de Medicamentos.
MÉTODOS: Estudo baseado na realização de entrevistas, em 2012, 
usando questionários semiestruturados, com atores sociais do mercado de 
medicamentos, representantes da indústria farmacêutica, de consumidores e do 
órgão regulador. Foram também compilados preços de medicamentos obtidos 
em pesquisas realizadas no Estado de São Paulo, nos pontos de venda, entre 
fevereiro de 2009 e maio de 2012.
RESULTADOS: As médias dos preços de medicamentos praticadas nos pontos 
de venda (farmácias e drogarias) estiveram muito abaixo do preço máximo ao 
consumidor, em relação à grande parte dos medicamentos comercializados 
no Brasil. Entre 2009 e 2012, 44 dos 129 preços praticados, correspondentes 
a 99 medicamentos constantes do banco de preços compilados, apresentaram 
variação superior a 20,0% entre a média de preços praticados nos pontos de venda 
e o preço máximo ao consumidor. Ademais, muitos laboratórios se recusaram 
a aplicar o coeficiente de adequação de preços nas vendas a órgãos públicos.
CONCLUSÕES: A regulação implementada pelo órgão regulador do mercado 
de medicamentos foi incapaz de controlar os preços de quantidade significativa 
dos medicamentos comercializados, pressionando-os a patamares inferiores 
àqueles determinados pela indústria farmacêutica e falhando, portanto, no seu 
objetivo de promover assistência farmacêutica. É necessária reforma da lei 
regulamentadora para permitir a redução de preços praticados no mercado pelo 
órgão regulador, bem como fortalecimento institucional desse órgão.
DESCRITORES: Preço de Medicamento. Medicamentos Essenciais, 
economia. Política Nacional de Medicamentos. Política Nacional de 
Assistência Farmacêutica. Regulação e Fiscalização em Saúde.
INTRODUCTION
conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Geography 
and Statistics (IBGE) in 2008-2009, families with a 
monthly income of less than R$830.00 spend 4.2% of 
such income on medicines, whereas families with a 
monthly income exceeding R$10,375.00 spend 1.9% 
of their income on these products.e The reason for the 
high cost of medicines is due to many factors that are 
mainly economic in nature.4,6,7,10,12,13,f Thus, in 2003, the 
Câmara de Regulação do Mercado de Medicamentos 
(CMED – Brazilian Drugs Market Regulation Chamber) 
created Law 10,742.9,13 The purpose of such policy was 
a Agência Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária. Regulação econômica do mercado farmacêutico. Brasília (DF); 2001 [cited 2012 may 15]. 
Available from: http://portal.anvisa.gov.br/wps/wcm/connect/
b Sindicato do Comércio Varejista de Produtos Farmacêutico. Dois gargalos na saúde: financiamento e acesso a medicamentos. São Paulo (SP); 
2010 [cited 2013 apr 15]. Available from: http://www.sindifarmajp.com.br
c Follador W. Alguns aspectos da variação de preços de medicamentos no Brasil no período de 1980 a 2001 [dissertation]. São Paulo (SP): 
Faculdade de Ciências Farmacêuticas da USP; 2001.
d Santos SCM. Busca na equidade no acesso a medicamentos no Brasil: os desafios impostos pela competição extra-preço [dissertation]. Rio 
de Janeiro (RJ): Escola Nacional de Saúde Pública da Fiocruz; 2001.
e Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística. Pesquisa de orçamentos familiares 2008-2009. Rio de Janeiro (RJ); 2010 [cited 2011 mar 16]. 
Available from: http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/populacao/condicaodevida/pof/2008_2009_encaa/pof_20082009_encaa.pdf
f Oliveira RR. Os conceitos de regulação em saúde no Brasil [dissertation]. São Paulo (SP): Faculdade de Medicina da USP; 2010.
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to increase pharmaceutical financial support to the public 
through economic regulation of the drugs market. The 
economic regulation exerted by the CMED is based on 
the prerogative of establishing criteria for establishing 
and adjusting medicine prices, as well as for fixing 
product profit margins to be observed by sales repre-
sentatives, distributors, pharmacies and drugstores.18,g
This field remains underexplored, and as a result there are 
few scientific studies that focus on the Brazilian Drugs 
Market Regulation Chamber or drug price regulation. The 
Brazilian Government itself still does not have any evalu-
ations of the regulation practiced by the CMED, as is the 
case regarding the effectiveness of this regulatory policy. 
The scientific literature on the subject is limited to analysis 
of the regulatory legislation, with there being no research 
on the results of implementing the regulation.1-3,7,11,15,16,18
The aim of this study is to analyze the implementation 
of the regulatory policy of drug prices that has been 
executed by the regulator.
METHODS
This study was developed based on four steps.
• Step 1: Legislative analysis on the subject and 
bibliographical research
The analysis focused on the regulatory legislation – Law 
10,742/2003, which establishes the guidelines for the 
economic price regulation policy and creates the Brazilian 
Drugs Market Regulation Chamber – and on the resolu-
tions issued by the regulating body. The legal instruments 
used by CMED are resolutions that establish regulatory 
criteria that must be observed by those who work in the 
pharmaceutical market, especially the pharmaceutical 
industry, distributors, pharmacies and drugstores.
• Step 2: Holding interviews
Because there are so few scientific studies on the imple-
mentation and effectiveness of economic regulation of 
the drug market by the CMED, it was necessary to hold 
interviews with social actors from the pharmaceutical 
market. From February to December 2012, the inter-
views were conducted, in person using semi-structured 
questionnaires, with the following social actors from 
the pharmaceutical market: representatives from the 
CMED (three advisors from the Executive Secretariat); 
a representative from a consumer protection agency 
(an economist at the Brazilian Consumer Protection 
Institute); a representative from the scientific commu-
nity (an economist at the Universidade deSão Paulo and 
the Brazilian Foundation for Economic Research which 
is involved in market research for medicinal products).h
The main questions that were put to the interviewees 
were as follows: Why regulate prices in the pharma-
ceutical market? What are the major difficulties and 
bottlenecks of the current policy for price regulation 
implemented by the CMED? Which measures could be 
used to make the CMED regulatory policy more efficient 
in terms of increasing the pharmaceutical support that 
is available to the population? Can better monitoring 
of drug prices positively influence the price control 
policy’s effectiveness? Does the CMED monitor actual 
drug prices, i.e., the prices charged on the market now?
• Step 3: Price research
A database was built based on real drug prices, which are 
defined as those charged in retail outlets. This database 
was built in order to compare market prices with the price 
ceiling as established by the CMED, the Maximum Price 
to the Consumer (MPC), while seeking to observe varia-
tions and any failure to comply with regulatory standards.
The prices charged at the sale points were obtained 
from surveys conducted by the Instituto de Defesa do 
Consumidor (IDEC – Brazilian Consumer Protection 
Institute) and by the Fundação de Proteção e Defesa 
do Consumidor (PROCON-SP – Foundation for 
Consumer Protection and Defense), from 2009 to 
2012. The MPC from the respective periods was 
obtained through the CMED resolutions, which were 
available in the portal of the Agência Nacional de 
Vigilância Sanitária (ANVISA – Brazilian National 
Health Surveillance Agency).i
Few surveys on drug prices have been performed 
in Brazil, especially those done by the IDEC or the 
PROCON-SP,j,k,l,m which were used to compose the 
prices database produced during this study. Such 
surveys are based on a yearly collection of drug prices 
in various Brazilian cities. The list of compiled drug 
prices changed from year to year, making any temporal 
analysis of one drug’s price evolution impossible. Only 
10 medicines from the drafted prices database had their 
g Teixeira L. Reajustes de preços administrados no setor da saúde. Brasília (DF): Câmara dos Deputados; 2006 [cited 2014 may 15]. Available 
from: http://bd.camara.gov.br/bd/bitstream/handle/bdcamara/1646/reajustes_precos_teixeira.pdf?sequence=4
h The initial goal was also to interview a representative from the pharmaceutical industry. However, despite numerous attempts, there were no 
members of the pharmaceutical industry who agreed to grant interviews for the purposes of this study. 
i Agência Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária. Listas de Preços de Medicamentos. Brasília (DF); 2015 [cited 2015 feb 21]. Available from: http://
portal.anvisa.gov.br/wps/portal/anvisa/anvisa/regulado
j Instituto de Defesa do Consumidor. Remédio pro bolso. Rev IDEC. 2009;130:16-20.
k Instituto de Defesa do Consumidor. Meio cheio ou meio vazio? Rev IDEC. 2010;142:22-5.
l Instituto de Defesa do Consumidor. Diferença além da conta. Rev IDEC. 2012;162:16-9
m Fundação de Defesa e Proteção do Consumidor do Estado de São Paulo. Pesquisa comparativa de preços de medicamentos. São Paulo (SP); 
2014 [cited 2014 jun 13]. Available from: http://www.procon.sp.gov.br/categoria.asp?id=903
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prices collected for all of the years during the observed 
period (2009 to 2012).
It was possible to observe that a significant amount of 
medicines, in different Brazilian cities, had mean point 
of sale prices that fell far short of the MPC stipulated 
by the CMED.
Given that the interviews were designed to find data 
that are already available in the public domain and 
is non-classified, no submission of the study to the 
research ethics committee was required.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Regulatory legislation analysis showed that the 
economic regulation exerted by the CMED took shape 
mainly in terms of defining criteria for establishing 
and adjusting drug prices, and determining the price 
adequacy coefficient to sales that is performed by 
public agencies.8,n As regards the price adjustment, the 
CMED distinguishes between price control for drug 
manufacturers and price control directed towards other 
traders.o The drug manufacturers have to observe the 
ceiling established by the factory price;p while the other 
traders, responsible selling drugs at retail outlets, have 
to observe the MPC.q The factory price is the maximum 
price at which a laboratory or distributor may market 
a drug, while the MPC is the highest price at which 
a medicine may be sold to the consumer in pharma-
cies or drugstores.5 The factory price and the MPC 
are both fixed annually and calculated by a numer-
ical formula that considers, among other factors, the 
productivity and the broad consumer price index for 
the period involved.r The CMED also establishes the 
price adequacy coefficient, which consists of a compul-
sory discount regarding certain medicines that are sold 
to supply the public health system.s This coefficient is 
recalculated annually from the mean ratio between the 
gross domestic product per capita in Brazil and in nine 
developed countries, while taking the human develop-
ment index into account.
The interviews and the data extracted from the prices 
database made it possible to observe two major prob-
lems for implementing the drug price regulation policy 
set out by the CMED: (i) the mean drug prices charged 
in retail outlets (pharmacies and drugstores) were 
far below the MPC, which represents a considerable 
portion of the drugs marketed in Brazil; (ii) many labo-
ratories refused to apply the price adequacy coefficient 
in sales made to public agencies.
Despite the difficulty encountered while compiling drug 
prices during this study, which made it impossible to 
assess price evolution patterns of one drug over the long 
term, it was possible to observe that the biggest problem 
for implementing the CMED’s regulatory policy is the 
large difference, which exists in most Brazilian cities, 
between the mean drug prices sold in retail outlets and 
the ceiling established by the regulator through the 
MPC. From 2009 to 2012, 44 of 129 prices, referring 
to 99 drugs listed in the price database, presented more 
than a 20.0% variation between the mean prices that are 
charged in retail outlets and the MPC for the respective 
period.t This affirmation indicates that the regulation 
implemented by the CMED is unable to push the prices 
of marketed medicines to levels that are lower than those 
determined by the pharmaceutical industry, thereby 
failing in its goal to facilitate access to medicines and 
in turn promote pharmaceutical support for the public. 
Thus, the CMED price regulation appears to be ineffec-
tive, due to being unable to interfere in the arbitration of 
prices for the most part of the drugs industry.
According to a representative from the interviewed 
consumers, a variation of less than 20.0% would be 
acceptable between prices at the point of sale and the 
ceiling established by the CMED. However, the mean 
variations were considerably higher than those deemed 
acceptable by this expert.
Contrary to what might be believed, this disparity 
between prices at the points of sale and the MPC estab-
lished by CMED does not portray the benefits bestowed 
by pharmacies to consumers through “discounts”, but it 
n Batista LB. Regulação econômica do mercado farmacêutico brasileiro [dissertation]. Rio de Janeiro (RJ): Universidade Cândido Mendes; 2005.
o Andrade A, Andrade CAP, Uliam FO. Controle de preços de remédios. ETIC. 2010 [cited 2015 feb 20] 6 (6). Available from: http://intertemas.
unitoledo.br/revista/index.php/ETIC/article/viewArticle/2412
p Agência Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária, Câmara de Regulação do Mercado de Medicamentos. Resolução 1, de 25 de fevereiro de 2005. 
Estabelece os critérios de composição de fatores para o ajuste de preços de medicamentos a ocorrer em 31 de março de 2005. Diario Oficial 
Uniao. 12 mar 2007;Seção 1:1.
q Agência Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária, Câmara de Regulação do Mercado de Medicamentos. Resolução 4, de 27 de julho de 2004. Dispõe 
sobre a forma de definição do Preço Fabricante e do Preço Máximo ao Consumidor dos medicamentos, estabelece a forma de apresentação 
de Relatório de Comercialização à Câmara de Regulação do Mercado de Medicamentos, disciplina a publicidade dos preços dos produtos 
farmacêuticos e define as margens de comercialização para esses produtos. Diario Oficial Uniao 29 mar 2004;Seção 1:4.
r Agência Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária, Câmara de Regulação do Mercado de Medicamentos. Resolução 1, de 27 de fevereiro de 2004. 
Estabelece os critérios de composição de fatores para o ajuste de preços de medicamentos a ocorrer em 31 de março de 2014. Diario Oficial 
Uniao. 28 fev 2004;Seção 1:2.
s Agência Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária, Câmara de Regulação do Mercado de Medicamentos. Resolução 4, de 18 de dezembro de 2006. 
Dispõe sobre o Coeficiente de Adequação de Preços – CAP, sua aplicação, e que e altera a Resolução CMED 2, de 5 de março de 2004. Diario 
Oficial Uniao. 12 mar 2007;Seção 1:1-2.
t For more information regarding the prices database cfr. Miziara NM. Market regulation of medicines: the CMED and price control policy [entitled 
dissertation]. São Paulo (SP): Faculdade de Direito da USP; 2013.
5Rev Saúde Pública 2015;49:35
does show the limits of drug price regulation in Brazil. 
The ceiling set by the Government is too high and such 
a discrepancy is harmful for consumers, due to the 
fact that sudden price changes may occur at any time. 
It is worth remembering that the annual readjustment 
overseen by the CMED is established based upon the 
maximum price for marketing a product (factory price 
or MPC) rather than in percentages.
The interviews showed considerable reasons behind 
the difference between the MPC and the prices charged 
in the market, such as the absence of effective moni-
toring of the drug prices at the points of sale and the 
lack of legal provision to make reductions in regu-
lated prices possible. The CMED does not monitor 
drug prices at retail outlets and therefore has no infor-
mation regarding the actual prices of these products 
in the market. This regulator relies solely on price 
figures from annual reports issued by pharmaceu-
tical laboratories and publications by Associação 
Brasileira do Comércio Farmacêutico (ABCFARMA 
– Brazilian Pharmaceutical Trade Association). These 
price sources cannot match those that monitor prices 
at retail outlets, since the ABCFARMA publications 
use the pharmaceutical industry as a direct source of 
information. Therefore, the CMED does not have any 
actual data regarding market prices, but rather infor-
mation provided by the industry itself – which can be 
assumed to be skewed – and subsequently has no way 
to control whether the regulation is effective in practice 
or not. As a practical result of having no way to monitor 
actual prices, the formula for determining the factory 
price and the MPC takes its information regarding 
prices directly from the pharmaceutical industry. 
Consequently, there is a significant difference between 
the price ceiling established by CMED and prices that 
are actually charged in the market. Within this consid-
erable gap between actual prices and the MPC are the 
readjustments that, in percentage terms and in practice, 
become much larger than those stated by the CMED 
and therefore become inflated for the period.
This also shows the regulator’s dependence on industry 
to obtain information, without which it cannot perform 
its institutional task properly. In the literature on regu-
lation, this problem was coined as “capture” and is 
considered as one of the reasons why regulatory action 
can ultimately serve the interests of the industry being 
regulated, all to the detriment of the collective interest.17
Based on interviews with representatives from the 
CMED, it was possible to observe that the regu-
lator recognizes the problem and justifies the signif-
icant difference between the so-called “discount” 
provided by the pharmaceutical industry and the estab-
lished ceiling, thereby assigning this situation to the 
high prices that charged and informed about by the 
pharmaceutical industry a short time before the creation 
of the new regulatory body, and also to the fact that the 
Law 10,742/2003 no longer expressly contemplates the 
possibility of reducing prices that are already charged. 
Based on the absence of any explicit forecast of cases 
in which they could operate a negative adjustment, 
any regulatory standard that involves price reductions 
might be deemed illegal, thereby generating legal 
disputes initiated by the pharmaceutical industry. Thus, 
the absence of calibratory or adjusting mechanisms of 
the regulatory standards ends up mitigating the effec-
tiveness of the law, which becomes unable to react, as 
would be expected from a regulatory standard in an 
industry as dynamic as medicines, to the unpredict-
ability and dynamism that defines it.
In addition to the aforementioned problems, the regu-
lation practiced by CMED also faces implementation 
difficulties in terms of applying the price adequacy 
coefficient, which is an obligatory discount that must 
be obeyed by the pharmaceutical companies that sell 
certain medicines to government bodies. The price 
adequacy coefficient is applied to product prices in 
the following circumstances: exceptional dispensation 
of drugs, drugs for the National STD/AIDS Program, 
drugs included in the Blood and Hemoderivative 
Products Program, antineoplastic drugs or those used 
as adjuvants in cancer treatment, drugs and products 
purchased by judicial order. In practice, many labo-
ratories fail to apply this discount of approximately 
24.0% to medicines sold to regional health depart-
ments, with it being a common occurrence for the 
government to overpay, the result of which is a risk for 
shortages in the public health system. When laborato-
ries are obliged to apply this coefficient, many of them 
choose not to participate in bids to win contracts to be 
drug suppliers to public administrations. According 
to the Sao Paulo State Public Health Secretariat, 66 
laboratories have already chosen not to participate in 
such bids in their State.u
In most cases, when there are instances where public 
bodies have been overcharged, the health secretariats 
are not notified and the CMED knows nothing about 
such an event, which implies an institutional communi-
cation problem within the government. The legislation 
is flawed, since it does not provide legal mechanisms 
that ensure dialog, and make such become indispens-
able, between the CMED and the public bodies who 
purchase the drugs. There is also no legal provision for 
instruments that can make sure that the price adequacy 
coefficient is applied on the behalf of the CMED. 
Consequently, even though this is the only regulatory 
body that has jurisdiction to punish those laborato-
ries that refuse to apply this coefficient, no sanction 
is applied to those who flout the regulatory standard.
u Credendio JE, Pinho A. Laboratório boicota remédio com desconto. Folha S. Paulo 2011 Apr 4;Cotidiano:3.
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In summary, the Law 10,742/2003 does not provide 
mechanisms that allow drug prices, which are already 
in the pharmaceutical market, to be reduced, which 
represents a problem for the CMED’s regulatory effec-
tiveness. As regards the considerable amount of drugs, 
this chamber does not influence price decision-making 
in the industry, therefore it is failing in its institutional 
goal to promote pharmaceutical support to the public. 
There is no doubt that legislative modification along 
these lines would facilitate increased pharmaceutical 
support by the CMED.
However, problems surrounding the price regulation 
practiced by this regulatory agency are not limited to 
normative quality issues. One of the major problems 
to be addressed is regarding the institutional capacity 
of the CMED to perform its tasks. There seems to be 
a lacking of a sufficient structure in this body to allow 
it to perform essential tasks in terms of regulating the 
market, such as, e.g., monitoring actual drug prices and 
creating mechanisms to monitor the application of the 
price adequacy coefficient, which, in practice, compro-
mises the quality of price regulation.
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